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Workers’ Compensation and Student-Athletes: 
Protecting the Unpaid Talent in the Profit-Making 
Enterprise of Collegiate Athletics 
SHAUN LOUGHLIN 
As everyone involved in college athletics continues to profit off of the 
millions of dollars in television contracts, student-athletes remain the sole 
contributors who are left out of the benefits. Student-athlete compensation 
debates have grown in recent years, while animosity toward the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association continues to grow as well. While jumping 
from no compensation to full salary and benefits similar to a professional 
athlete is unlikely, there are other ways in which universities can 
compensate their student-athletes. One way to partially compensate 
athletes for their contributions on the field can come in the form of 
workers’ compensation payments. 
This Note argues that recent decisions in the Ninth Circuit and the 
National Labor Relations Board have begun to redefine student-athletes as 
employees, and because of this, they should be entitled to workers’ 
compensation payments. While this is not a full salary, providing workers’ 
compensation is feasible for universities and it can be the first step to 
compensating student-athletes who make millions of dollars for their 
schools, conferences, and the NCAA as a whole. 
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Workers’ Compensation and Student-Athletes: 
Protecting the Unpaid Talent in the Profit-Making 
Enterprise of Collegiate Athletics 
SHAUN LOUGHLIN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Attacking the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) for its 
treatment of student-athletes has become very much in vogue in the year 
2016. For years now, there have been rallying cries to change the way the 
“non-profit”1 organization treats the athletes. Whether it be for cutting 
them out of the highly lucrative television deals orchestrated with 
ESPN/ABC, FOX, NBC, or CBS,2 or changing endorsement rules to avoid 
punishments of players caught in inappropriate relationships with boosters 
or agents,3 the argument for the revocation of “amateur” status for student-
                                                                                                                          
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2017; Syracuse University, B.A. 2013.  
I would like to thank the editors of Volume 48 of the Connecticut Law Review for their guidance and 
feedback throughout the publication process. Specifically, I would like to thank my Notes & Comments 
Editor, Nicole Palermo, and Professor Lewis Kurlantzick for their continued support and guidance, 
from a fledgling research idea, all the way through to final drafting. I would like to thank my friends 
and family for their support throughout the drafting of this Note and for my entire time in law school. 
Lastly, many thanks to Matthew Sponheimer for suggesting this topic and influencing my research 
efforts. 
1 See Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2011, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/ [https://per 
ma.cc/7QHX-F6GW] (“From the summary tax forms required of non-profits, [attorney Rick Johnson] 
found that the NCAA had spent nearly $1 million chartering private jets in 2006. ‘What kind of non-
profit organization leases private jets?’”). See generally Richard G. Johnson, Submarining Due 
Process: How the NCAA Uses Its Restitution Rule to Deprive College Athletes of Their Right of Access 
to the Courts . . . Until Oliver v. NCAA, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 459, 621 (2010) (using court 
transcripts from the Oliver case to research how the NCAA appropriates portions of its revenue, such as 
private jet travel). 
2 See Richard T. Karcher, Broadcast Rights, Unjust Enrichment, and the Student-Athlete, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 107, 110 (2012) (challenging the assumption that student-athletes do not have any 
interest in the multi-billion dollar television deals, and therefore, do not have any share of the broadcast 
licensing revenues). 
3 See Michael A. Corgan, Comment, Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept Endorsement Deals: A 
Solution to the Financial Corruption of College Athletics Created by Unethical Sports Agents and the 
NCAA’s Revenue-Generating Scheme, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 371, 374 (2012) (suggesting that 
the NCAA should lower its stance on “amateurism” while looking at rectifying the seemingly constant 
reports of inappropriate relationships with sports agents); see also Branch, supra note 1 (highlighting 
multiple cases, including: the revocation of Reggie Bush’s 2005 Heisman Trophy and the University of 
Southern California’s 2004 national championship because Bush received airfare, limousine rides, and 
rent-free homes from an agent; the rumors surrounding former Auburn University quarterback, Cam 
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athletes, or at the very least some leniency in punishment, is nearly 
constant. Just about all of the benefits that the NCAA and its member 
universities receive from performance on the field, court, or ice are not 
shared with the athletes, which could be seen as unjust enrichment.4  
These attacks are well-reasoned, however, because there is money to 
be had in the multi-billion dollar industry that universities, networks, and 
the NCAA enjoy. For example, the recent switch from the Bowl 
Championship Series postseason format to the College Football Playoff 
format for Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) teams included a 
new television deal between ESPN and the NCAA which has been 
estimated at about $5.6 billion over twelve years (approximately $470 
million annually).5 Furthermore, in 2013, it was found that thirty-nine out 
of fifty states listed their highest-paid employee as either a state university 
football coach, or men’s basketball coach (with the exception of 
Connecticut, which lists its women’s basketball coach).6 Comparing these 
massive dollar amounts to complaints from scholarship athletes who claim 
that they cannot eat university food after 7:15 p.m. because of NCAA 
regulations7 creates a sentiment that something is out of balance and must 
be changed within the system. In order to alleviate these issues, some 
believe that unionization is the most effective way for athletes to 
collectively bargain for more rights, and that student-athletes should be 
viewed as employees under labor law.8 And we have seen recent attempts 
to do just that, with efforts by football players to unionize and collectively 
bargain at Northwestern University9 along with challenges against the 
                                                                                                                          
Newton, and his father’s alleged attempt to solicit up to $180,000 from Mississippi State University 
recruiters; and the investigation into a University of Miami booster that provided benefits and money to 
over seventy football players over the course of nearly a decade). 
4 See Karcher, supra note 2, at 111 (providing a theory for recognition of student-athletes’ interest 
in broadcast rights based on common law unjust enrichment, on behalf of the “defendant” universities 
and NCAA). 
5 Rachel Bachman, ESPN Strikes Deal for College Football Playoff, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324851704578133223970790516 [http://web.arch 
ive.org/web/*/http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324851704578133223970790516]. 
6 Reuben Fischer-Baum, Infographic: Is Your State’s Highest-Paid Employee a Coach? 
(Probably), DEADSPIN (May 9, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://deadspin.com/infographic-is-your-states-highest-
paid-employee-a-co-489635228 [https://perma.cc/3JLD-AE2H]. 
7 Sara Ganim, UConn Guard on Unions: I Go to Bed ‘Starving’, CNN (Apr. 8, 2014, 1:26 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/07/us/ncaa-basketball-finals-shabazz-napier-hungry/ 
[https://perma.cc/4UHV-26VY] (discussing former basketball player, Shabazz Napier’s comments 
regarding the Northwestern University football team’s attempts to unionize and his complaints of the 
overall system of collegiate athletics). 
8 See Northwestern Univ. (Northwestern II), No. 13-RC-121359, 2015 NLRB LEXIS 613, at *2 
(Aug. 17, 2015) (declining an attempt by the Division I football team to collectively bargain with 
Northwestern University); Nicholas Fram & T. Ward Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: A Legal 
Blueprint to Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (2012) (asking whether 
current labor law would support a union of college athletes). 
9 Northwestern II, 2015 NLRB LEXIS 613, at *1. 
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NCAA in federal court under the Sherman Antitrust Act.10 The overall 
effectiveness of these challenges is not yet fully known, but as more arise, 
the status of college athletes as employees of their respective universities 
could change. 
Currently, the closest form of compensation that athletes receive from 
their universities is in the form of a scholarship equal to the full cost of 
attendance to their university, rather than the grant-in-aid scholarship that 
athletes used to receive.11 This change in the scholarship award, of course, 
is insufficient for many who still believe athletes are being exploited, and 
litigation is now aimed towards revoking the caps placed on compensation 
by the NCAA.12 But aside from compensation, the status of an athlete and 
his role within the university is also up for debate. What is a “student-
athlete,” and can athletes be deemed “employees” of their university, by 
law? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then an entire new 
set of rights become available to these athletes—one of which being the 
ability to file workers’ compensation claims. 
It has been argued that the creation of the term “student-athlete” was 
developed by the NCAA “not in a disinterested ideal but in a sophistic 
formulation designed . . . to help the NCAA in its ‘fight against workmen’s 
compensation insurance claims for injured football players.’”13 The term 
was deliberately crafted by the NCAA to be ambiguous—it was important 
to avoid thinking about these individuals as students simply playing a 
game, because that undermined their athletic commitment to the school, 
but also to avoid thinking about them as just athletes who happened to be 
enrolled at a college.14 The latter of the two characterizations would 
potentially imply that they were professionals, and thus, entitled to 
compensation claims.15 Instead, these athletes now fall into legal 
purgatory, in which they are subject to control by their “employer” 
university, without the legal protections provided for traditional 
employees. 
The Knight Commission, which works closely with the NCAA to 
“recommend a reform agenda that emphasize[s] academic values in an 
arena where commercialization of college sports often overshadow[s] the 
                                                                                                                          
10 O’Bannon v. NCAA (O’Bannon II), 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015); O’Bannon v. NCAA 
(O’Bannon I), 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
11 O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1054–55. 
12 See In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 4:14-md-02541-CW, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 163878, at *15–16 (9th Cir. 2015) (certifying three classes of collegiate athletes to sue the 
NCAA for compensation beyond the full cost of tuition). 
13 See Branch, supra note 1 (quoting sports economist Andrew Zimbalist). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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underlying goals of higher education,”16 has reported that “[a]pproximately 
one percent of NCAA men’s basketball players and two percent of NCAA 
football players are drafted by NBA or NFL teams.”17 Despite the very 
slim odds of a lucrative career, injuries are very common in college 
athletics, and many can linger beyond the time an athlete leaves school. 
The NCAA has provided a catastrophic insurance plan, which as of 2013 
carried a $90,000 deductible.18 Beyond this coverage, however, there is no 
requirement by the NCAA for schools to provide workers’ compensation 
coverage, and the main source of injury coverage for athletes is their 
families’ health insurance plans.19 This coverage is insufficient,20 given 
that major injuries with potentially long-term effects on athletes could still 
fail to reach the catastrophic coverage deductible, rendering an athlete 
without benefits. 
The goal of this Note is to revisit the availability of workers’ 
compensation, given recent legal developments in the status of student-
athletes. First, it will discuss the two recent decisions handed down in 2015 
by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Ninth Circuit. 
While their jurisdictions do not overlap with state-run workers’ 
compensation, their legal effects will have a ripple effect down to workers’ 
compensation claims, and their evidentiary records are instrumental in 
helping to illuminate on how a college athlete could potentially be viewed 
as an employee under state common law. Secondly, this Note will explain 
the common law jurisprudence behind determining whether one is an 
employee, capable of receiving workers’ compensation benefits. Several 
cases which are often discussed in the realm of student-athletes and 
workers’ compensation now seem outdated and could potentially see a 
reversal from the precedents that they hold. Third, this Note will attempt to 
take the modern college athlete and show how his current commitment and 
responsibilities under the agreement to play for his university create an 
employer-employee relationship in which the university has the right to 
                                                                                                                          
16 About, KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, 
http://www.knightcommission.org/about/about-background [https://perma.cc/3A7K-5TFF] (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2016). 
17 Branch, supra note 1. 
18 See NCAA Catastrophic Injury Insurance Program Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/insurance/student-athlete-insurance-programs [https://perma.cc/ 
4494-ENFZ]  (last visited Sept. 12, 2016) (“Anyone who meets the deductible is eligible for Medical, 
Dental, Rehabilitation, and Custodial Care benefits, but there are other policy benefits that are available 
only to individuals who are Totally Disabled as a result of a covered injury.”). 
19 See Frank P. Tiscione, College Athletes and Workers’ Compensation: Why the Courts Get it 
Wrong in Denying Student-Athletes Workers’ Compensation Benefits When They Get Injured, 14 
SPORTS LAW. J. 137, 139–40 (2007) (explaining historical payouts of the catastrophic plan, which used 
to cover $10,000 per athlete). 
20 See infra Part V (calculating a basic workers’ compensation claim and discussing the difficulty 
in reaching a $90,000 deductible, even for fairly serious injuries). 
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exercise control over the athlete, and thus, the athlete has the right to file 
claims for workers’ compensation. That is followed by an example of how 
claims could be calculated in the current landscape of collegiate athletics, 
where one is deemed to be compensated by his scholarship, which now 
equals the full cost of attendance. 
Before concluding, the final section reviews the necessity and 
feasibility of actually providing these benefits. Despite the fact that it 
seems as though current athletes should and could make workers’ 
compensation claims against their universities, is it feasible to provide the 
coverage, and do the athletes need it? Reviewing not only the legal right to 
benefits, but also the cost effects and potential issues with NCAA tenets of 
amateurism are important. 
Discrepancies between the revenue-generation among different sports, 
or laws separating public or private universities may cause the allowance 
of workers’ compensation to ask more questions than it answers, but if an 
athlete is to be granted the position of employee at a university, or treated 
as such, he has statutorily guaranteed rights that include receiving coverage 
for injuries suffered while in the scope of his employment. As the 
profiteering through college athletics continues, the push towards 
providing financial security for student-athletes will push forward as well. 
Workers’ compensation is but a modest and reasonable expansion of the 
benefits that athletes currently receive. 
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EMPLOYEE STATUS 
OF COLLEGIATE ATHLETES 
A. Northwestern University and the National Labor Relations Act 
The two most recent pushes toward recognizing student-athletes as 
more than merely amateurs have come from claims under the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
respectively.21 In January 2014, Kain Colter, former quarterback for the 
Northwestern University Wildcats football team, joined with a 
representative from an organization titled the College Athletes Players 
Association to appeal to the NLRB to form the first student-athlete labor 
union.22 One example among the myriad of claims that Colter and his 
committee made was the lack of medical coverage that athletes received in 
                                                                                                                          
21 See O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1052–53 (holding that allowing NCAA member schools to 
provide scholarships up to full cost of attendance was a sufficient remedy to antitrust violations, but 
that cash compensation up to $5,000 was erroneous); Northwestern II, 2015 NLRB LEXIS 613, at *1–2 
(declining to assert jurisdiction over whether college football players are statutory employees under the 
National Labor Relations Act). 
22 Ben Strauss, In a First, Northwestern Players Seek Unionization, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2014, at 
B10 (describing the NCAA model as a “dictatorship” in his efforts to form a union). 
 1744 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1737 
order to alleviate any injuries suffered while participating in collegiate 
sporting events.23 Petitioners argued that student-athletes are “employees” 
within the NLRA, because the NCAA provides them grant-in-aid 
scholarships,24 and thus, are entitled to representation for the purposes of 
collective bargaining.25 The regional director presiding over the hearing 
agreed, ruling that the players be allowed to conduct an election to create a  
union under the direction of the Board.26 
The Director chose to construe the word “employee” broadly, relying 
on the common law definition of one who performs services for another 
under a contract of hire, subject to one’s control, and in return for 
payment.27 This reasoning began with the fact that the football program 
had made upwards of $235 million over the previous decade—a total that 
has directly benefitted the university which these players attend.28 Further, 
the services that the players performed in order to provide the benefit to the 
university were compensated in the form of the scholarships.29 This 
scholarship is provided much like a “tender” that one must sign before his 
employment begins, and the Director found the players to be so financially 
dependent on the scholarship, regardless of their position/role on the team, 
that it was akin to an employment contract.30 
The second, and more pertinent factor in determining whether one is 
an employee in state workers’ compensation law, as explained below,31 is 
the level of control that the employer had the right to exercise over its 
employees.32 The Director relied on the evidentiary record provided by the 
                                                                                                                          
23 See id. (“‘The same medical issues that professional athletes face are the same medical issues 
collegiate athletes face, except we’re left unprotected,’ Colter said.”). 
24 The act defines an “employee” as: 
[A]ny employee, and shall not be limited to the employees for a particular employer, 
unless the [NLRA] explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual 
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor 
dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other 
regular and substantially equivalent employment . . . . 
National Labor Relations Act, 74 Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449, 450 § 2(3) (1935) (codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012)). 
25 Northwestern Univ. (Northwestern I), No. 13-RC-121359, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *1, *2 
(Mar. 26, 2014). 
26 See id. at *2–3 (“Eligible to vote are all football players receiving football grant-in-aid 
scholarship and not having exhausted their playing eligibility employed by [Northwestern 
University].”). 
27 Id. at *39–40 (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995)). 
28 Id. at *41. 
29 See id. at *41–42 (valuing the scholarship up to as much as $76,000 per year, which is not 
provided in the form of paychecks, but is still a “substantial economic benefit for playing football”). 
30 See id. at *42–44 (adding that the potential threat of losing one’s scholarship added to the goal 
of performing at the highest level for the university). 
31 See infra Part IV. 
32 Northwestern I, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *45. 
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parties to show that the hourly commitment, both in and out of season,33 
the ability of coaches to discipline athletes for absence or tardiness,34 and 
the stranglehold that the football program places on the athletes’ academic 
schedules35 all amounted to a case in which an employer had the right to 
control its employees, and the university exercised that right on a daily 
basis. 
This major win for the Northwestern University football team was 
short-lived, however, when the case reached the NLRB in August 2015.  
The five-member panel of the Board, whose decision was binding on the 
lower regional director, chose to not assert their jurisdiction at all, and 
decided not to answer the penultimate question of whether or not student-
athletes are statutory employees.36 The Board determined that even if the 
athletes were statutory employees, “it would not effectuate the policies of 
the [NLRA] to assert jurisdiction.”37 One of the main issues that caused the 
Board to avoid asserting jurisdiction was the fact that Northwestern was 
just one university in a group of twelve member schools of the Big Ten 
Conference and one of 128 that participate in Division I FBS within the 
NCAA.38 Any labor dispute at one university would have ramifications at 
other member universities.39 
In addition to Northwestern University’s relationship with the Big Ten 
and the NCAA, the Board worried about the distinction between public and 
private universities, which would invoke state collective bargaining 
agreement legislation.40 Before concluding, however, the Board made sure 
to limit the reach of its decision to just this opinion—even making sure to 
explicitly note that the Northwestern University football team could file a 
                                                                                                                          
33 See id. at *45–47 (summarizing the hourly commitment at approximately fifty to sixty hours 
per week in the preseason and training camp, forty to fifty when in season with class in session, and 
even allotting twenty-five hours for two-day trips to away games). 
34 See id. at *47 (explaining how athletes are required to attend additional study hall periods or 
run laps at practice as punishment for violations of team rules). 
35 See id. at *49 (explaining how players are sometimes forced to miss class for travel 
requirements, and also that they cannot take some classes at all because it would interfere with football 
practice). 
36 See Northwestern II, 2015 NLRB LEXIS 613, at *2 (“We conclude that asserting jurisdiction in 
this case would not serve to promote stability in labor relations.”). 
37 Id. at *12. 
38 See id. at *18–19 (“As a result, labor issues directly involving only an individual team and its 
players would also affect the NCAA, the Big Ten, and the other member institutions.”). 
39 Id. at *19. The Board did attempt to reason that the NCAA’s control over member institutions 
is not the sole reason for declining to assert jurisdiction, but rather bargaining at a single-team level 
does not “promote labor stability.” Id. at *19 n.15. 
40 See id. at *22–23 (looking to state laws that explicitly prohibit collective bargaining by state 
employees). 
 1746 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1737 
claim in the future, to reassess the issue.41 The changing landscape of 
collegiate athletics caused the Board to leave this topic open for future 
adjudication, admitting that “recent changes, as well as calls for additional 
reforms, suggest that the situation of scholarship players may well change 
in the near future.”42 One of the stated recent changes came just forty-four 
days later, in federal court. 
B. O’Bannon and the Sherman Antitrust Act 
On September 30, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
ruled in O’Bannon v. NCAA,43 which some have deemed a “hollow 
victory”44 for college athletes, but still a step in the right direction, 
nonetheless. Despite “the latter part of the decision echoing the NCAA’s 
hoary rationale that amateurism is the sine qua non of college sports,”45 the 
court found that the NCAA’s amateurism rules are subject to antitrust 
scrutiny.46 In seeking alternatives to antitrust violations, and provide some 
form of compensation for using athletes’ names, images, and likenesses, 
the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that allowing NCAA members 
to provide scholarships up to the full cost of attendance would be 
appropriate.47 However, the circuit court decision departed from the district 
court after the full cost of attendance holding, stating that “the district 
court’s other remedy, allowing students to be paid cash compensation of up 
to $5,000 per year, was erroneous.”48 Still, it was concluded that there were 
no other alternatives to the market that Division I student-athletes were 
entering from high school, and thus colleges and the NCAA were agreeing 
to value the players’ likenesses at zero dollars without any other market 
                                                                                                                          
41 See id. at *29 (“[I]f the circumstances of Northwestern’s players or FBS football change such 
that the underpinnings of our conclusions regarding jurisdiction warrant reassessment, the Board may 
revisit its policy in this area.”) (internal citations omitted). 
42 Id.  
43 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
44 See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Op-Ed, In a First, O’Bannon’s Hollow Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2015, 
at A23 (arguing that the “[d]ecades of propaganda” about amateurism from the NCAA has had an 
effect on arbiters that will not fully go against the Association). It is also worth noting that Nocera 
deemed the NLRB’s decision to not assert jurisdiction in the Northwestern case was a “remarkable act 
of cowardice.” Id.; see also Sasha Volokh, Op-Ed, No Slam Dunk in Ninth Circuit Antitrust Ruling in 
O’Bannon v. NCAA, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/09/30/no-slam-dunk-in-ninth-circuit-antitrust-ruling-in-obannon-v-ncaa/ [https:// 
perma.cc/8WWW-RGNV] (calling the decision a “partial victory”). 
45 Nocera, supra note 44. 
46 See O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1053 (holding the NCAA’s tenet of amateurism to scrutiny under 
antitrust law’s Rule of Reason). 
47 Id. (affirming in part, but reversing the attempt to provide $5,000 compensation to each 
athlete). 
48 Id. 
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competing for the athletes.49  The Ninth Circuit saw this reasoning as a 
way to equate the NCAA and its member schools to a cartel—“a group of 
sellers who have colluded to fix the price of their product.”50 
The circuit court agreed with the NCAA, however, when it came to the 
argument that its compensation rules serve the procompetitive purposes of 
integrating academics and athletics and preserving the product of 
“amateurism.”51 The NCAA argued on appeal that the district court paid no 
attention to the fact that providing the opportunity for student-athletes to 
attend a Division I university is “the only opportunity [they will] have to 
obtain a college education while playing competitive sports as students.”52 
While the court agreed with the sentiment that sometimes restraints can 
broaden a student’s choices, there was no way that a student-athlete would 
have more educational choices solely because he was not allowed to be 
compensated.53 Rather, the court believed that “if anything, loosening or 
abandoning the compensation rules might be the best way to ‘widen’ 
recruits’ range of choices.”54 Allowing student-athletes to earn income 
with the knowledge that schools are competing for them might not only 
encourage students to attend school in the first place, but also keep them in 
school longer once they arrive.55 
In the time that passed between the district and circuit court opinions, 
the NCAA had begun to allow schools to provide athletic scholarships for 
the full cost of attendance to student-athletes.56 The “cost of attendance” 
scholarships that are now allowed include the same goods that made up a 
grant-in-aid, plus additional books and supplies, transportation expenses, 
and other personal expenses.57 The difference between the full cost of 
attendance and its former form of scholarship was valued to be a difference 
                                                                                                                          
49 See id. at 1057 (quoting O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 968, 972) (arguing that without these 
anticompetitive rules, schools would be able to compete for athletes, which would lower the price they 
pay to go to school). 
50 Id. at 1058. 
51 Id. at 1073 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85, 120 (1984)). 
52 Id. at 1072 (emphasis in original). 
53 See id. at 1072–73 (arguing that the opportunity to obtain a college education would still exist, 
regardless of whether athletes got paid or not). 
54 Id. at 1073 (citing Jeffrey L. Harrison & Casey C. Harrison, The Law and Economics of the 
NCAA’s Claim to Monospony Rights, 54 ANTITRUST BULL. 923, 948 (2009)). 
55 Id. (citing Harrison & Harrison, supra note 54, at 948); see also Harrison & Harrison, supra 
note 54, at 948 (arguing that the current policy of non-compensation lowers the quality of collegiate 
athletics). 
56 O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1054–55; see also Marc Tracy, Top Conferences to Allow Aid for 
Athletes’ Full Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2015, at SP8 (stating that the universities the “Power Five” 
conferences 79–1 for the resolution, with the lone dissenter worrying that this further separates student-
athletes from the rest of the student body). 
57 O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1054 n.3. 
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of “a few thousand dollars at most schools.”58 In a continuation of the 
“hollow victory”59 sentiment previously mentioned, Dr. Mark Emmert, 
president of the NCAA, admitted during testimony that this movement 
toward full cost of attendance scholarships would have little impact on the 
Association and its tenet of amateurism.60 
These two cases have been the most recent, but they are hardly the last 
attempts to dismantle the NCAA’s model of amateur athletics. Two 
months after the O’Bannon decision, the Ninth Circuit was discussing 
compensation of collegiate athletes once more, with the certification of 
three classes of individuals—Division I football players, Division I men’s 
basketball players, and Division I women’s basketball players.61 This 
ongoing suit is aimed directly at striking down NCAA bylaws barring 
compensation for top-tier Division I football and basketball players, and 
will most likely be consolidated with previous classes that have been 
certified in New Jersey.62 While litigation was pending, the NCAA agreed 
to allow schools to provide scholarships to players up to the full cost of 
attendance.63 Still, the class of plaintiffs seeks to enjoin the cap that the 
NCAA set on grant-in-aid scholarships, although they do not ask for 
unlimited compensation of collegiate athletes.64 Rather, they would 
welcome the NCAA to “maintain a role in determining how compensation 
would be set without the current [grant-in-aid] cap.”65 
Regardless of the outcome in this pending litigation, and regardless of 
whether people pessimistically view the recent developments as a “partial 
victory,”66 the fact remains that there are shifting tides in the debate over 
the employment status of collegiate athletes. Public opinion may still be 
against the “pay-for-play” system,67 but advocates for compensation and 
                                                                                                                          
58 Id. 
59 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
60 See O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1075 (mentioning Emmert’s testimony at trial and how he 
essentially conceded to cost of attendance scholarships). 
61 In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 14-2541, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
163878, at *15–16 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015). 
62 Marc Tracy, Case that Could Erode Amateur Model Takes a Small Step, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 
2015, at B13 (examining the potential effects of the pending lawsuit). The case has been orchestrated 
by Jeffrey Kessler, a N.Y. antitrust lawyer who represented the NFL union in obtaining free agency and 
Tom Brady in the “Deflategate” scandal. Id. 
63 In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163878, at *16–
17; see also supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
64 In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163878, at *44–
45. 
65 Id. at *45. 
66 Volokh, supra note 44. 
67 See Alex Prewitt, Large Majority Opposes Paying NCAA Athletes, Washington Post–ABC 
News Poll Finds, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/large-
majority-opposes-paying-ncaa-athletes-washington-post-abc-news-poll-finds/2014/03/22/c411a32e-
b130-11e3-95e8-39bef8e9a48b_story.html [https://perma.cc/QC2N-6N47] (reporting that 33% of 
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employment status have let their voices be heard in the courtroom, which 
is why it is valuable to revisit what the implications for workers’ 
compensation would be if the status of student-athletes is eventually 
changed. With a change in status of student-athletes as employees, 
workers’ compensation benefits will surely be affected. 
III. COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENTS OF THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE 
RELATIONSHIP IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 
Workers’ compensation statutes across the country generally have the 
same characteristics, which allow for “modest but assured” benefit 
payments, within certain similar limitations.68 The overarching policy 
behind the statute is that even if “the employer’s conduct be flawless . . . 
and . . . the employee’s be abysmal in its clumsiness, rashness and 
ineptitude; if the accident arises out of and in the course of the 
employment, the employee receives an award.”69 Before the 
implementation of these statutes, it was virtually impossible for employees 
to overcome affirmative defenses raised by the employer in tort cases.70 In 
turn, workers’ compensation laws render employers free from liability 
outside of the controlling workers’ compensation statute, and employees 
lose the chance to file common law tort claims.71 Along with determining 
the rights that employees and employers have, one must also determine the 
actual employment status of the plaintiff, which “almost always takes the 
form of distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor.”72 
This is necessary because an employer is not liable for the payment of 
workers’ compensation claims arising out of injuries suffered by 
                                                                                                                          
people polled supported paying college athletes, while 64% opposed). Those polled seemed to be more 
favorable towards allowing athletes to collectively bargain and negotiate as a union—47% of the same 
group supported unionization and 47% opposed. Id. 
68 See 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 1.01 (MB, rev. ed. 2015) 
(summarizing a typical workers’ compensation statute). 
69 Id. § 1.03(1). 
70 See Mark R. Whitmore, Note, Denying Scholarship Athletes Workers’ Compensation: Do 
Courts Punt Away a Statutory Right?, 76 IOWA L. REV. 763, 768–69 (1991) (describing contributory 
negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow servant doctrine as “formidable defenses” for 
employers). 
71 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-284(a) (2015) (“An employer who complies with the 
requirements of [this act] shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury 
sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment . . . .”); see also Isabella v. 
Koubek, 733 F.3d 384, 392 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that exclusive remedy under New York workers’ 
compensation law is a trade-off between providing immediate coverage for an employee and protecting 
employers from suit) (citations omitted); Rettig v. Town of Woodbridge, 41 A.3d 267, 274 (Conn. 
2012) (stating that the employee surrenders his right to bring a common law action because the purpose 
of Connecticut workers’ compensation law was to provide compensation for injuries, regardless of 
fault); see also Whitmore, supra note 70, at 770–71 (discussing the theory that employees must accept 
a statutorily designated amount as compensation). 
72 LARSON, supra note 68, at § 60.02. 
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independent contractors.73 
A specific definition of “employee” is absent from most workers’ 
compensation statutes, which has led jurisdictions to adopt their own 
definition through the courts.74 Typically, the definition that courts use 
derives from the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220, defining what 
constitutes a “servant.”75 Courts have used this section of the Restatement 
to determine whether or not one is an employee by looking at factors such 
as: 
(1) right to discharge; (2) mode of payment; (3) supplying 
tools or equipment; (4) belief of the parties in the existence 
of an employer-employee relationship; (5) control over the 
means used in the results reached; (6) length of employment; 
and (7) establishment of the work boundaries.76 
On the surface, different characterizations are used for defining an 
“employee,” depending on the governing body in question—for example, 
the Internal Revenue Service utilizes a twenty-factor test in determining 
one’s status as an employee.77 Obviously, a test with twenty factors looks 
much different than the Restatement test provided above. However, where 
there is consistency among governing bodies, both state and federal, in 
determining the status of a person as an employee, is in the tests utilized by 
courts in common law.78 The same three tests presented below, utilized by 
                                                                                                                          
73 Compare Rayner v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 245 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that 
claimant was not an employee just because defendant treated claimant’s employees as his own), and 
Davis v. Perkins, 620 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a carpenter who volunteered 
to work on a barn re-building project on his own was an independent contractor), with Liggett Constr. 
Co. v. Griffin, 629 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982) (finding a claimant to be employed by the 
company subcontracted to paint defendant’s building and subject to workers’ compensation coverage), 
and Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp. v. Potts, 850 P.2d 1135, 1136 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (holding a “grip man” on 
a movie set, taught how to perform his job while on set, was an employee eligible for coverage, 
because not every factor in the test for employment needs to be present for coverage); see also 
Whitmore, supra note 70, at 773. 
74 See LARSON, supra note 68, at § 60.01 (describing most definitions of “employee” as general 
phrases such as “every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express, or 
implied.”). 
75 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
76 GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Hale v. Kemp, 579 N.E.2d 63, 
67 (Ind. 1991)). In addition to the Restatement, Larson’s definitions of “employee” from his treatise 
have also been utilized in court opinions. See, e.g., Munson v. D.C. Dep’t of Empl. Servs., 721 A.2d. 
623, 625–26 (D.C. 1998) (examining Larson’s treatise to determine whether to rely on the “right to 
control” or the “relative nature of the work” when reviewing whether one is an employee or not) 
(internal citations omitted). 
77 Charles J. Muhl, What is an Employee? The Answer Depends on the Federal Law, MONTHLY 
LAB. REV., Jan. 2002, at 3, 5, www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/01/art1full.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9YB-
ZZU6]. 
78 See id. at 5–6 (presenting three different common law tests, created by courts, and utilized by 
various federal agencies). 
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state supreme courts in various workers’ compensation cases, are the same 
three tests that have been adopted by the likes of the National Labor 
Relations Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, 
and by the Immigration Reform and Control Act, to name just several 
examples.79 
When workers’ compensation cases do reach court, typically courts to 
view both workers’ compensation statutes and the above standard liberally, 
with the goal of benefitting employees and insuring the “equitable 
purposes” of workers’ compensation laws.80 Even still, it has been a near 
impossible challenge to lay out a bright line between employee and 
independent contractor.81 Thus, courts rely on different standards, which 
encapsulate parts of the Restatement test above, to determine the status of 
benefit claimants.82 
The “control test” seeks to determine whether one is an employee, 
based on four factors: (1) direct evidence of a right or exercise of control; 
(2) method of payment; (3) whether furniture or supplies are equipped; and 
(4) whether there is a right to terminate.83 Since the control test is factor-
based, there are times when one may be found to be an employee, despite 
the absence or insufficiency of one of these factors.84 This test, perhaps 
more so than its counterpart described below, relies on factual findings 
determined through analysis under the Restatement § 220, before balancing 
them together in an attempt to determine the status of the claimant.85 
In contrast, the “relative nature of the work test” is more contextual 
than its counterpart, in that it asks whether the employee’s duties are a 
                                                                                                                          
79 Id. at 6. 
80 Whitmore, supra note 70, at 767–68. The attempts to construe the statutes liberally have led to 
broadening the body part that was deemed injured, so as to maximize payout, deeming someone an 
employee over an independent contractor to secure payment, and presuming that contracts between 
employer-employee included workers’ compensation coverage. Id. at 768 n.23. 
81 See LARSON, supra note 68, at § 60.02 (explaining that most jurisdictions lay out a factor test 
like Restatement § 220, and then let the trier of fact determine employment status). 
82 See Tiscione, supra note 19, at 141–44 (discussing various tests commonly found across 
jurisdictions). 
83 See Jenkins v. Am. Transp., Inc., No. 2140153, 2015 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 243, at *1, *7 (Oct. 
16, 2015) (laying out factors to be determined) (citing ex parte Curry, 607 So.2d 230, 232–33 (Ala. 
1992)); Johnson v. Helicopter & Airplane Servs. Corp., 389 F. Supp. 509, 516 (D. Md. 1974) (using 
five factors, but highlighting the importance of the power to discharge) (internal citations omitted); see 
also Beaverdale Mem. Park, Inc. v. Danaher, 15 A.2d 17, 19 (Conn. 1940) (“The fundamental 
distinction between an employee and an independent contractor depends upon the existence or 
nonexistence of the right to control the means and methods of work.”) (internal citations omitted); 
Tiscione, supra note 19, at 142 n.27 (listing other jurisdictions using the control test). 
84 See Jenkins, 2015 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 243, at *18–20 (concluding that the manner in which 
plaintiff was paid was not determinative of his employment status). 
85 See Tiscione, supra note 19, at 142 (“The Restatement focuses primarily on the master’s ability 
to control the physical conduct of servants performing their duties.”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
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substantial and recurring part of the employer’s business.86 Lastly, the less 
commonly used “economic reality test” is similar to the “control test” in its 
application, despite the fact that the four factors utilized differ slightly: (1) 
the employer’s right to control the employee; (2) the employer’s right to 
discipline or fire the employee; (3) the payment of wages; and (4) whether 
the task performed was “an integral part of the proposed employer’s 
business.”87 This test, too, does not have one factor that is controlling in 
every case, and cases can be viewed by the totality of the circumstances.88 
Despite the availability of these tests for courts to utilize, previous case 
law pertaining to collegiate athletes and workers’ compensation benefits 
has seemingly focused on the intent of the parties—mainly the intent of the 
university when it provided a scholarship for the athlete.89 Furthermore, 
challenges in court are few and far between, with many opinions arising in 
the mid-twentieth century.90 Still, it is essential to review the cases to 
understand what past jurisprudence has provided when looking forward to 
potential workers’ compensation benefits in the future. 
Cases have formed on both sides of the workers’ compensation for 
collegiate athletes debate, and what is intriguing about the reasoning of 
each side is that the various courts have either highlighted or ignored each 
of the various factors laid out in the tests above, leading to no true theme as 
to what factor makes college athletes either employees or non-employees. 
University of Denver v. Nemeth91 presented the first opportunity to see how 
a court reasoned with respect to a collegiate athlete’s entitlement to 
workers’ compensation benefits, when a football player suffered a back 
injury while he was on campus at the University of Denver.92 The claimant 
held an athletic scholarship, and also worked on campus as a maintenance 
worker, which was contingent on his participation on the football team.93 
                                                                                                                          
86 Whitmore, supra note 70, at 775 (citing Evans v. Naihaus, 326 So.2d 601, 604 (La. Ct. App. 
1976)); see also Tiscione, supra note 19, at 142 n.32 (referencing various case supporting Evans). 
87 Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224, 225–26 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Askew v. 
Macomber, 247 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Mich. 1976)). 
88 See id. at 226 (“[A]ll [factors are] taken into account in determining the existence of an 
employment relationship.”); see also Tiscione, supra note 19, at 143 (citing Coleman in explaining the 
test in comparison to control and relative nature tests). 
89 See Michael J. Mondello & Joseph Beckham, Counterpoint, Workers’ Compensation and 
Collegiate Athletes: The Debate over the Pay for Play Model, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 293, 297–98 (2002) 
(discussing how schools tend to argue that scholarships are provided with the intent of providing an 
education before any other priority). 
90 The cases examined in this Note were decided years ago, yet they are nonetheless the same 
opinions used in discussions regarding this topic in academic writing as recently as Tiscione’s article 
from 2007.  
91 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953) (en banc). 
92 Id. at 424. 
93 See id. at 426 (“Nemeth was informed by those having authority at the University, that ‘it 
would be decided on the football field who receives the meals and the jobs.’ He participated in football 
practice . . . and he was then given free meals and a job.”). 
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This contingent employment was a main determinant for the court, which 
concluded that an injury arises from the course of employment if it stems 
from the “conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment; in other 
words, out of the employment looked at in any of its aspects.”94 Thus, the 
maintenance job that was tied to the injured student-athlete’s participation 
on the football team was incident to his employment as a member of the 
maintenance crew on campus.95 
A California Court of Appeals echoed the Supreme Court of 
Colorado’s opinion in Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Commission,96 
providing workers’ compensation benefits to the family of a scholarship 
athlete at California State Polytechnic College who had died in a plane 
crash.97 Much like the claimant in Nemeth, the athlete in this case received 
free housing and some small compensation payments in return for working 
on campus; in this case, Van Horn worked in the cafeteria.98 This 
employment, according to the Court, was only offered to athletes on the 
football team, through their coach.99 The prima facie case for benefits that 
the claimant had proved in this case had to be upheld in the name of public 
policy.100 
The Van Horn decision, benefitting student-athletes, was short-lived, 
as the California legislature sought to exclude college athletes from 
workers’ compensation benefits through a statutory amendment shortly 
after this case.101 Additionally, Colorado also departed from its own 
holding in Nemeth in State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial 
Accident Commission.102 That court did not necessarily overturn Nemeth, 
but it did distinguish Nemeth by stating that Fort Lewis A & M College did 
not directly benefit from the claimant’s participation on the football team, 
since the part-time job he held at the school was not contingent on playing 
                                                                                                                          
94 Id. at 426 (quoting Caswell’s Case, 26 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Mass. 1940)); see also Tiscione, supra 
note 19, at 144–45 (discussing Nemeth). 
95 See Nemeth, 257 P.2d at 430 (explaining that Nemeth had the physical capability to play 
football, which is why the university hired him to work on campus). 
96 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963), superseded by statute CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352 (West 
2016), as recognized in Shephard v. Loyola Marymount Univ., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 829, 832–33 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 2002). 
97 See id. at 175 (declining to extend employment status to every scholarship athlete). 
98 Id. at 170. 
99 See id. at 172–73 (relying on coach’s testimony to show that a contract existed as part of 
claimant’s prima facie case for benefits as an employee). 
100 See id. at 174 (comparing college athletes to churches, charitable organizations, and other 
publicly supported institutions to argue for supporting benefits in this case) (internal citations omitted). 
101 See Tiscione, supra note 19, at 146 (stating that amendments were passed in 1965 and again in 
1981). 
102 Id. (citing State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 314 P.2d 288, 288 (Colo. 
1957)). 
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football like the claimant in Nemeth.103 According to the court, a contract 
between the student and the university in Nemeth clearly existed, but in 
this case it apparently did not—the court concluded that it could not extend 
the liberal construction of the workers’ compensation statute past the 
“plain, clear, and explicit language.”104 
Indiana also sided against providing workers’ compensation benefits 
for college athletes after a scholarship player fractured his spine while 
playing football.105 The debate in Rensing v. Indiana State University 
Board of Trustees became whether or not a “grant-in-aid” scholarship was 
an employment contract.106 That court found that the scholarship is not 
equivalent to “pay” because the NCAA did not allow schools to pay its 
athletes, it was reasonably tied to the student-athlete’s education on 
campus, and it was not taxable income under Indiana state law.107 Finding 
that a player’s scholarship could not be taken away from him based on his 
performance on the field contravened the element of an employer’s right to 
discharge in defining the claimant as an “employee.”108 In this case the 
claimant did not have a part-time job to help his argument, and therefore, 
the benefits were withheld.109 
In Coleman v. Western Michigan University,110 the court applied the 
previously mentioned economic reality test.111 In that case, the court 
seemed to either side with the plaintiff, or at least concede some part of his 
argument, in three out of the four test factors, yet still ruled in the 
university’s favor, denying the plaintiff from workers’ compensation 
benefits.112 The court emphasized that “[n]one of the foregoing factors is 
by itself dispositive”113 before concurring with the claimant that a 
university does have a sense of control and discipline over a scholarship 
athlete, in addition to the fact that a scholarship does constitute “wages” 
under Michigan law.114 
                                                                                                                          
103 See State Comp. Ins. Fund, 314 P.2d at 290 (en banc) (stating that claimant obtained a job in 
order to stay in school, but not solely to continue playing football). 
104 Id. 
105 Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1170 (Ind. 1983). 
106 Id. at 1172. 
107 Id. at 1173. 
108 Id. at 1174. 
109 See id. at 1175 (“Rensing held no other job with the University and therefore cannot be 
considered an ‘employee’ of the University within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act.”). 
110 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
111 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
112 See Coleman, 336 N.W.2d at 227 (“The application of the ‘economic reality test’, and the 
determination of the existence of a ‘contract for hire’ . . . is a question of fact rather than one of law.”). 
113 Id. 
114 See id. (claiming that because a player could not lose his scholarship for an entire year after 
being removed from the team, the university did not have enough control to warrant an employee-
employer relationship). 
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Where the court separated from the claimant’s argument was on the 
final factor: whether the task performed by the proposed employee was an 
integral part of the employer’s business.115 Because scholarships were 
offered for other achievements besides athletics (arts, music, etc.) and 
since the claimant stated that he used the football scholarship to fund his 
education, the court sided with the university because “the term ‘integral’ 
suggests that the task performed by the employee is one upon which the 
proposed employer depends in order to successfully carry out its 
operation.”116 
To address once more the idea of intent between the parties behind 
many of these court decisions, it is important to note that in both Nemeth 
and Van Horn, the claimants that received benefits were injured during 
football activities.117 They were both awarded compensation based on the 
fact that they held jobs on campus that were outside the scope of football, 
yet still inside the scope of employment with the university.118 This line of 
reasoning has led to a conclusion that there is a “flat proposition that it is 
an absolute prerequisite of employment relation that the parties intend to 
create an employment relation, and think of themselves as employer and 
employee.”119 The same intent that the university has when hiring a 
groundskeeper120 is apparently not present when one seeks to provide a 
four-year scholarship to a student-athlete.121 This judicial reliance on intent 
in the cases above is seen as a “fallacy,”122 however, and it is naïve to think 
that student-athletes do not believe that they are paying for play, and 
therefore cannot receive workers’ compensation benefits.123 
Alvis Waldrep, the most recent unsuccessful claimant who sought 
workers’ compensation benefits from Texas Christian University while 
permanently confined to a wheelchair due to football, was denied because 
there was no contract for hire within his scholarship, and the university did 
not withhold income taxes from his financial aid.124 In regards to the intent 
                                                                                                                          
115 See id. at 226–27 (quoting the lower court’s opinion that the primary function of the university 
was to provide education and not athletics). 
116 Id. 
117 LARSON, supra note 68, at § 22.04(1)(c). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 See Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d at 424 (“At the time [of his injury], he was receiving 
$50 per month from the University for certain work in and about the tennis court on its campus.”). 
121 See Branch, supra note 1 (examining the string of cases described in this Note in which 
schools could hide behind the “myth of the student-athlete”). 
122 LARSON, supra note 68, at § 22.04(1)(c). 
123 See id. (“Anyone who reads the sports pages knows that the controversy about professionalism 
in college football is still a lively and ongoing one, either because NCAA rules are too lax or because 
they are not obeyed.”). 
124 See Waldrep v. Tex. Emp. Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692, 698, 700 (Tex. App. 2000) (stating that 
one may receive a benefit from another in return for services and not become an employee) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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of the university, Waldrep was certainly not naïve: “[school officials] said 
they recruited me as a student, not an athlete,” which Waldrep claimed to 
be “absurd.”125 
Relying on the intent of the employer in these cases allows a university 
to tell the court whatever they would like, in regards to what their intent 
was at the time they recruited the athlete. The actions of the university, 
however, in their profiteering off of the athletes’ performance, speak to a 
much different intent than one that solely provides a free education, with 
participation in athletics coming along as a byproduct. Intent cannot be the 
main determining factor, when the right and exercise of control over the 
athletes are so great as to warrant employment status. 
IV. EXAMINING THE RIGHT AND EXERCISE OF CONTROL OVER AN 
ATHLETE—MAKING AN EMPLOYEE OUT OF THE MODERN DAY COLLEGE 
FOOTBALL PLAYER 
Admittedly, attempting to use the National Labor Relations Act to 
form an argument for providing benefits under a state statute is not ideal.126 
But what the Northwestern University case lacks in guidance for resolving 
workers’ compensation disputes, it makes up for with the NLRB’s 
tremendous insight into the day-to-day activities of a college athlete,127 
most specifically a Division I football player. This helps show a student-
athlete’s status as an employee under one of the legal tests used in 
workers’ compensation cases, and supports Waldrep’s argument that 
recruiting is typically aimed towards those with athletic prowess, rather 
than solely academic potential. Despite the fact that Northwestern 
University is private, and a majority of universities that would be affected 
by the change in status of student-athletes are public, the schedule and 
overall work performed by the Northwestern University athletes, under the 
direction of their coaches, is akin to student-athletes at other universities at 
this level,128 and therefore, still an example of the control that is exerted 
over athletes by their universities. 
                                                                                                                          
125 Branch, supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
126 While the NLRB has authority to examine labor disputes at private universities only, the 
passage of the NLRA sought to hear disputes pertaining to the “inequality of bargaining power” 
between employees and their employers. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). There is no jurisdiction for providing 
benefits under the Act. Id. 
127 See generally Northwestern I, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *10–26 (2014) (explaining the 
special rules that the athletes must adhere to, the daily schedules of their work, broken down by hour, 
and various other commitments to the program that are mandatory of all players on the roster). 
128 See id. at *3–4 (explaining that the University, and football team in particular, compete against 
other schools in the Big Ten conference, and in the Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS)). 
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A. Using Northwestern University’s Year-Round Football Routine to 
Discuss the Right and Exercise of Control Over Athletes 
Northwestern University student-athletes must adhere to a Team 
Handbook, which is not required of students who do not participate in 
sports.129 In addition to following this Handbook, players are told where 
they must live;130 they must provide all information regarding their social 
media accounts;131 and if they want to obtain employment outside of the 
team, they must obtain permission from the University’s athletic 
department.132 The University requires this last piece so that it may keep 
track of any type of compensation that an athlete may be receiving.133 
Lastly, athletes must wear specific formal attire on game days, and must 
adhere to academic standards or face disciplinary action.134 These 
requirements, much stricter than what most employers require from their 
employees at almost any other job, do not include anything related to on-
field activities—the reason why many of these student-athletes come to 
school in the first place. 
The Northwestern football program begins its season in August with a 
one month training camp,135 and continues for approximately five 
months—this year’s team completed its season on January 1, 2016, in one 
of the NCAA’s famed New Year’s Day bowls.136 This August training 
camp consists of an itinerary for each player, booked straight through from 
8:30 a.m. to 10:30 p.m. “lights out”—meals, lodging, medical treatment, 
classroom time, and practices are all laid out for players, who work for 
about fifty to sixty hours per week throughout the month.137 The hourly 
commitment is minimized slightly as the season and school year both 
begin. However, whatever time is not spent on the field, is spent 
performing some other mandatory task such as traveling to an away game 
                                                                                                                          
129 Id. at *10. 
130 See id. at *10–11 (explaining that freshman and sophomores must remain in on-campus 
dormitories, and upperclassmen may move off campus, only if they receive permission from their head 
coach). 
131 See id. at *11 (describing the social media policy they must abide by, including random checks 
on their account, and mandatory “friend” request acceptances from coaches). 
132 Id. at *10–11. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at *12–13. 
135 Id. at *13. 
136 The football team posted a historic 10–3 record, ranking in the Top 25 schools in the nation, 
but lost their final game of the season to the University of Tennessee, 45–46. 2015 FOOTBALL 
SCHEDULE, www.nusports.com/schedule.aspx?path=football [https://perma.cc/3BNP-N3LA] (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2016). 
137 See Northwestern I, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *13–15 (providing the daily schedule for the 
team while on their annual trip to Kenosha, Wisconsin). 
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or sitting in study hall for tutoring.138 Even when mandatory events are not 
allowed by NCAA rules, players are still strongly encouraged to attend 
practices orchestrated by the quarterback and/or a team trainer, due to a 
ban on coaches’ attendance.139 Football season continues beyond the bowl 
game with weight room workouts and spring football programs beginning 
almost immediately after the supposed culmination.140 Even throughout 
spring workouts, and into the summer, there is little time off for these 
players, who work year-round for their university’s football program.141 
Lastly, and in today’s college football landscape, perhaps most 
importantly, the student-athletes in the program generated $235 million in 
revenue for Northwestern University over the decade prior to the NLRB 
decision—$30.1 million of this revenue came in the 2012–2013 season 
alone.142 These numbers pale in comparison to institutions where the 
football program is more nationally prominent. The University of Texas 
football team generated over $128 million in revenue for the school during 
the 2014–2015 season, and fellow rivals of Northwestern in the Big Ten 
Conference, 2015 national champion Ohio State University and the 
University of Michigan, generated over $93 million and $112 million in 
revenue, respectively.143 These numbers, which climb higher and higher 
each calendar year, have reached a point at which these programs’ revenue 
streams are an integral part of the university’s operations. And these 
revenue streams are created primarily because of the talent of student-
athletes, despite opinions like Coleman, which stated that these student-
athletes do not carry out an “integral” task for their employers/universities, 
and therefore could not receive workers’ compensation benefits.144 
A university’s right to control and exercise of control seems to be 
satisfied in a potential benefit dispute at Northwestern University. The 
ability to dictate the daily, and almost hourly movements of each and every 
player on the team, while they work towards a goal of providing athletic 
                                                                                                                          
138 See id. at *18–21 (explaining the players’ schedule during a trip to the University of Michigan 
in 2012 for an away football game). 
139 See, e.g., id. at *17 (“[T]he coaches are not permitted to compel the players to practice again 
later in the day. The players, however, regularly hold 7-on-7 drills . . . outside the presence of their 
coaches.”). 
140 See id. at *22 (“Following the Bowl game, there is a two-week discretionary period where the 
players have the option to go into the weight room to work out.”). Head coaches may not attend these 
work outs, by NCAA rule, but may rejoin their team to begin working again in mid-January. Id. 
141 See id. at *26 (stating that there are a couple weeks spent at home following the academic year, 
before players must return back to campus for begin training). 
142 Id. at *37–38. 
143 See Jared Diamond, What’s Your College Team Worth?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/whats-your-college-team-worth-1421081367 [http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20160416055257/http://www.wsj.com/articles/whats-your-college-team-worth-1421081367] (valuing 
the Ohio State University football program with an intrinsic value of $1.12 billion). 
144 Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224, 227 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
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and financial success, could lead a fact-finder to find, much like the NLRB 
found, that there is control in this relationship that is indicative of an 
employer-employee relationship.  Further, “[c]ontrol is necessarily implied 
in every contract that gives the employer the right to insist that services be 
performed according to specifications.”145 The scholarship that is offered to 
the student-athlete would imply that control exists. Scholarship athletes 
also hold onto their financial aid throughout their college career; however, 
there are cases in which universities may revoke the scholarship for good 
cause.146 The ability to terminate is still present. The one factor within the 
control test still under serious contention is the method of payment, which 
is why one of the reasons why the employment status of a student-athlete is 
still unsettled. 
B. Reviewing the Status of Northwestern University Football Players 
Under the Economic Reality Test 
Under the economic reality test,147 a football player at Northwestern 
University may have more success today than in 1963, when Coleman was 
decided. Not only are revenues ever-rising,148 but television deals are now 
more lucrative than ever. Not only did Division I FBS settle on an 
approximately $470 million television deal annually149 but also in 2010, 
when CBS renewed its deal with the NCAA to air the entirety of the Men’s 
Basketball Championship Tournament, it brought in a second television 
conglomerate, Turner Broadcasting, to help broadcast all sixty-seven 
games, and that deal settled at $10.8 billion for fourteen years.150 
Collegiate athletics, with football being the leading sport, have become a 
“profit making enterprise.”151 Perhaps the new age of profiteering could 
sway a court towards recognizing an athlete as an employee in a workers’ 
compensation claim, if it chooses to utilize the economic reality test. 
                                                                                                                          
145 See, e.g., Larry’s Post Co. v. Unemployment Ins. Div., 777 P.2d 325, 328 (Mont. 2003) (citing 
St. Regis Paper Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm’n, 487 P.2d 524, 527 (Mont. 1971)) (allowing for 
unemployment benefits to be provided to a claimant that the employer knew he had control of, before 
making the employee sign an exemption). 
146 See 2015–16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 15.3.4.2, 196–97 (2015), 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D116.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6XJ-TWKS] 
[hereinafter NCAA MANUAL] (allowing revocation for academic eligibility, fraudulent activities, and 
serious misconduct). 
147 See supra note 87. 
148 See Diamond, supra note 143 (noting that values of programs have shot up recently, due in 
part both to revenue and the ever-increasing value of professional leagues, which trickle down to value 
of college programs). 
149 Bachman, supra note 5. 
150 Press Release, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, CBS Sports, Turner Broad., NCAA Reach 14-
Year Agreement (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/2010-04-21/cbs-sports-
turner-broadcasting-ncaa-reach-14-year-agreement [https://perma.cc/2FYL-WAK3]. 
151 Tiscione, supra note 19, at 138 (citing Whitmore, supra note 70, at 763 n.1). 
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V. CALCULATING WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS FOR COLLEGE 
FOOTBALL PLAYERS WITH FULL COST OF ATTENDANCE SCHOLARSHIPS 
UNDER CONNECTICUT STATUTE 
Calculating workers’ compensation payments for a college athlete 
would be difficult, given that an athlete’s compensation is not a traditional 
hourly wage or salary. Pending future litigation, such as the case that 
recently had its classes certified,152 as the law currently stands, the 
“compensation” that a college athlete receives is now set at a cap up to full 
cost of attendance at his respective university.153 This cost of attendance 
total provides an athlete with a quantifiable amount that can be utilized into 
a workers’ compensation claim. As unorthodox as this may seem, when 
attempting to determine one’s average weekly wage (which is used to 
calculate benefit payments), the method is not unheard of. In the past, 
some courts have taken into account room, board, food, and other non-
monetary factors when attempting to calculate average weekly wages.154 
Indeed, workers’ compensation has historically been seen as generally 
intended to compensate for lost earnings or earning capacity, but broad 
readings of the word “income” allow for non-monetary aspects of a job to 
be calculated.155 Therefore, even though the actual outcome will differ by 
state, like all other aspects of workers’ compensation law,156 there is a 
potential for a dependable, numeric value to be used when calculating 
benefits for college athletes. 
Workers’ compensation is calculated in very similar ways across all 
states, with slight variations in the rates of payment to employees.157 
Payments will begin with an “average weekly wage,” which operates the 
                                                                                                                          
152 See In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163878, at 
*15–16 (9th Cir. 2015) (certifying two classes of collegiate athletes from three separate sports to sue 
the NCAA). 
153 O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1075–76 (holding that grant-in-aid caps on compensation violate 
antitrust law and that full cost of attendance is more appropriate and less restrictive). 
154 See Smith v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 259 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (holding that 
lower court erred when calculating the wage rate of a graduate-level nurse, rather than using the non-
monetary compensation received as a student nurse); George L. Blum, Annotation, Workers’ 
Compensation: Value of Employer-Provided Room, Board, or Clothing as Factor in Determining Basis 
for or Calculation of Amount of Compensation Under State Workers’ Compensation Statute, 48 A.L.R. 
6th 387, § 4, 411–18 (2009) (surveying jurisdictions and situations in which room and board are/are not 
seen as compensation). But see Macsuga v. Moreno, 66 P.3d 409 (Okla. 2003) (holding that when the 
evidentiary record is without any projected value of non-monetary room and board, it cannot properly 
be calculated in to wage earnings). 
155 See Blum, supra note 154, at § 3, 408–09 (using market value to calculate what the 
“reasonable value” of room and board may be). 
156 See id. at § 4, 411–18 (annotating a discussion on room and board in workers’ compensation 
payments based on state statutes). 
157 See LARSON, supra note 68, at § 1.01 (“The typical workers’ compensation act has these 
features . . . benefits to the employee include cash-wage benefits, usually around one-half to two-thirds 
of the employee’s average weekly wage, and hospital, medical, and rehabilitation expenses.”). 
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same across the country, but is defined under Connecticut law as: 
[D]ividing the total wages received by the injured employee 
from the employer in whose service the employee is injured 
during the fifty-two calendar weeks immediately preceding 
the week during which the employee was injured, by the 
number of calendar weeks during which, or any portion of 
which, the employee was actually employed by the 
employer . . . .158 
The State of Connecticut then takes this wage total, and multiplies it by 
a total of seventy-five percent of the “difference between the wages 
currently earned by an employee in a position comparable to the position 
held by the injured employee before his injury[.]”159 If an employee is not 
working at a new position, then the current wage will be zero dollars, 
leaving the full seventy-five percent of the previous wage total to be 
calculated into payments. That total is multiplied by a total amount of 
weeks of compensation, set by a schedule under statute, depending on the 
partial incapacity of one’s body part.160 The product of this equation 
becomes the payment amount for an injured employee. 
Here is where the full cost of attendance price tag can be a viable 
option to represent an athlete’s “wage” within a claim. Using the 
University of Connecticut as an example, the full cost of attendance for the 
2015–2016 school year was $47,344.161 Debating whether or not a football 
player works fifty-two weeks out of the year is, much like the debate over 
whether they are even employees in the first place, much larger than this 
discussion and still unsettled. Given the description of what a football 
player endures at Northwestern University,162 however, it is fairly safe to 
argue that a Division I FBS athlete works on his craft year-round. Thus, it 
would be fair to calculate an athlete’s compensation by dividing UConn’s 
full cost of attendance by fifty-two weeks, equating to an average weekly 
wage of $910.46. 
During the 2015 season, a sophomore offensive lineman injured his 
lower leg after only playing in one game—an unfortunate loss for the 
Huskies.163 According to Connecticut’s schedule of payment for partial or 
                                                                                                                          
158 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-310(a) (2015). 
159 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-308 (2015). 
160 Id. 
161 Tuition & Costs, UCONN, http://uconn.edu/admissions/tuition-and-costs/ [https://perma.cc/ 
K7QZ-3FCU] (last visited Jan. 8, 2016) (including tuition, university and student fees, residence hall 
fees, university meals, and other yearly expenses for an out-of-state student). 
162 See supra Part IV(a). 
163 Desmond Conner, UConn Football Insider: Best and Worst of 2015, HARTFORD COURANT 
(Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.courant.com/sports/uconn-football/hc-uconn-footbal-best-worst-of-season-
0106-20160105-story.html [https://perma.cc/4QJ9-SPSX] (“[L]osing sophomore offensive lineman, 
Ryan Crozier (lower leg) for the season may have been the most critical [injury] of them all.”). 
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total incapacity of a body part, the athlete could have received 125 weeks 
of compensation for an injury to one foot, with loss coming at or above the 
ankle.164 If this lineman is a full scholarship athlete, his average weekly 
wage of $910.46 would be multiplied by seventy-five percent, and paid out 
over the next two years or so, to match the schedule of payment under 
statute.165 A workers’ compensation claim could provide the athlete, who 
was is sidelined, incapacitated with injury, with approximately $85,355.77 
over the next two years. Furthermore, if he were to have a permanent 
partial disability to his leg, payments under Connecticut law could 
continue after the 125 weeks of partial incapacity payments ceased.166 
This lower leg injury will most likely not render the athlete totally 
disabled, nor will it end his life, which means that his family has no claim 
to the NCAA’s $25,000 death benefit under its Catastrophic Coverage 
Plan.167 If his treatment does not surpass $90,000168 then where will the 
coverage come from? More importantly, if this lineman were a junior or 
senior, the treatment to his leg would continue after he left UConn and his 
scholarship expired. The NCAA claims that the goal of its Catastrophic 
Plan is to avoid having an athlete pay out-of-pocket expenses for major 
injuries,169 but with a health plan with such a high deductible and no 
coverage guarantees beyond the time an athlete spends in college, there is 
risk that one moves on from a university after performing a service for 
them, and is left without coverage, whereas workers’ compensation could 
at least provide a modest payment for the injury that an athlete suffers. For 
the nearly 99% of college athletes who do not go on to play professional 
sports, this payment can certainly help. 
VI. EXAMINING THE REALISTIC NECESSITY AND FEASIBILITY OF 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION FOR STUDENT-ATHLETES 
If we recognize the legal right that student-athletes have to workers’ 
compensation payments, the next question is whether it truly is feasible or 
necessary to provide it. Student-athletes are injured quite often, yet they 
always manage to get the medical care they need.170 The NCAA also 
                                                                                                                          
164 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-308 (West 2015). 
165 Id. 
166 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-308a (West 2015) (allowing for the State to make payments 
of seventy-five percent of average weekly wage for partial permanent disability after the temporary 
payments expire). 
167 See NCAA Catastrophic Injury Insurance Program Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 18 
(applying to Aug. 1, 2012 to Jul. 31, 2013 policy period). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 See Juanita Sheely, Insurance Coverage for Student Athletes, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
(May 20, 2015, 5:05 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-safety/sport-science-institute/insurance-
coverage-student-athletes#_ftnref1 [https://perma.cc/V5EH-BSUD] (“Member[] [universities] are 
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allows them to sit out for a season without losing eligibility, which 
provides the athlete with the four seasons he intends to play when he walks 
onto campus.171 But still, workers’ compensation is not just about medical 
care, although it also plays a major role in the coverage.172 Rather, “[t]he 
main purpose of workers’ compensation laws is to provide employees a 
guaranteed remedy for injuries arising in the course of serving their 
employers.”173 The historical thinking behind workers’ compensation 
statutes is that if one is an employee, there is a relationship in which the 
employee is guaranteed benefits at the expense of not suing employers.174 
It is a guarantee that an employee holds simply because he risks the chance 
of injury for the sake of his employer. It is not a bonus added on to a 
paycheck. If student-athletes are eventually going to be considered 
employees of their universities, then this is a natural development that must 
also accompany the new status. 
A. Avoiding the Worries of Open Market Competition and Preserving 
“Amateurism” with Workers’ Compensation Payments 
Much of the O’Bannon litigation, based on antitrust law, discussed the 
disruption of the competitive collegiate market if athletes were paid, with 
the aim being to not disrupt its procompetitive practices.175 Indeed, as the 
NCAA argued, the court understood that the opportunity to earn a higher 
education is what attracts athletes to college, and being paid some form of 
compensation would still make this option available to them.176 The court 
then supported the payment of full cost of attendance scholarships as a 
substantially less restrictive alternative under antitrust law’s Rule of 
Reason,177 but stopped short of allowing the athletes to receive cash 
compensation for the use of their names and likenesses (specifically in 
                                                                                                                          
permitted to provide that coverage, but they are not required to do so. Coverage can be provided 
through the school, a parent/guardian policy or a policy student-athletes have on their own. If coverage 
by some source is not in place, the student-athlete cannot practice or play.”). 
171 See, e.g., NCAA MANUAL, supra note 146, at § 12.8.4 (allowing an athlete to retain a year of 
eligibility if they suffer a season-ending injury/illness within the first 30% of the season). 
172 See LARSON, supra note 68, at § 1.01 (“The typical workers’ compensation act has these 
features . . . . Benefits to the employee include cash-wage benefits, usually around one-half to two-
thirds of the employee’s average weekly wage, and hospital, medical, and rehabilitation expenses.”). 
173 Whitmore, supra note 70, at 767–68. 
174 See id. (ensuring this guarantee by construing the definition of “employee” liberally). 
175 See O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1056 (“First, the [district] court found there is a ‘college 
education market’ in which FBS football and Division I basketball schools compete to recruit the best 
high school players by offering them ‘unique bundles of goods and services’ that include not only 
scholarship but also coaching, athletic facilities, and the opportunity to face high-quality athletic 
competition.”). 
176 See id. at 1073 (stating that a pro-competitive market for college athletes still exists). 
177 See id. at 1075 (limiting courts by saying that they should not continue to use antitrust law to 
micromanage universities). 
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video games) because it does not promote amateurism.178 
But workers’ compensation is not compensation for the use of names 
and likeness. Rather, it is a protection against potential injuries that players 
are risking by playing sports at a university. Injuries occur, with or without 
amateurism and competitive college markets being affected, and making 
benefits available to athletes does nothing more than compensate them for 
providing a service to their university. No one wants workers’ 
compensation benefits to kick in. Much like basic health insurance, it is a 
system that is in place to protect loss that, ideally, no one wants to occur. It 
seems outlandish to think that student-athletes will seek injury and 
sacrifice playing time to receive benefits. Therefore, having universities 
provide these benefits does not change the competitive market between 
schools vying for talented athletes; especially if all schools have them. The 
O’Bannon Court found that paying students cash compensation would not 
promote amateurism.179 However, the cash compensation question was 
answered in response to the question of marketability of individual 
athletes, which is much different than providing workers’ compensation 
benefits. 
B. Handling the Cost of Providing Workers’ Compensation to Student-
Athletes 
Paying for workers’ compensation coverage is based on a market of 
various plans offered by insurers, and as seen in states like California, the 
state itself does not regulate the prices of plans.180 In a 2013 report, the 
National Academy of Social Insurance placed the average cost of 
providing benefits to workers at approximately $1 for every $100 of 
covered wages.181 While the market for providing coverage to student 
athletes is not fully formed, if it came at a cost of one-one hundredth of the 
scholarships provided, universities would likely be able to cover it. The 
revenue that television networks and universities are receiving through 
athletics has been discussed ad nauseam, but there is no argument that 
everyone is profiting more from the performance of college athletes 
nowadays. A Duke University economist concluded several years ago that 
                                                                                                                          
178 Id. at 1076 (footnote omitted). 
179 See id. at 1076 (“[T]he district court ignored that not paying student-athletes is precisely what 
makes them amateurs.”) (internal footnote omitted). 
180 See, e.g., Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About Workers’ Compensation for 
Employers, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. RELATIONS (June 2016), http://www.dir.ca.gov/ 
dwc/faqs.html [https://perma.cc/8BTB-CZDK] (an independent regulatory board dictates pricing for 
employers). 
181 See Ishita Sengupta et al., Workers’ Compensation: Benefits, Coverage, and Costs, 2011, NAT. 
ACAD. OF SOCIAL INS., at 1, 2, https://www.nasi.org/research/2013/report-workers-compensation-
benefits-coverage-costs-2011 [https://perma.cc/43RW-8MQF]  (comparing to employers’ cost of 
providing coverage in 2011 at $1.27 for every $100). 
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since 1984, the salaries of head football coaches at public universities 
increased by 750%, adjusted for inflation.182 In 2009, for the first time, 
even an assistant college football coach surpassed $1 million in yearly 
salary.183 Quite simply, with all of the new revenue that universities are 
receiving, there is potential for coverage to be provided to college football 
players for such a nominal amount, especially given the fact that not all of 
them would become injured to the point of receiving payments. The cost of 
workers’ compensation benefits is both reasonable and feasible for 
universities within the NCAA. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There are admittedly many variables to consider when offering 
workers’ compensation benefits to student-athletes. The state-operated 
workers’ compensation system in general has created unpredictability that 
may only be fixed by creating a uniform system run by the federal 
government.184 Some states, such as California and Hawaii, have 
specifically exempted scholarship athletes from obtaining workers’ 
compensation, for example.185 Conversely, Nevada has embraced 
scholarship athletes, and passed laws specifically protecting those within 
its state university system, subject to court review of their scope of 
employment.186 
Other discrepancies between the sports that generate revenue and those 
that do not, or private and public universities, or perhaps maybe gender 
concerns based on Title IX could enter the debate on whether workers’ 
compensation benefits could be feasible. But what should not be debated is 
that the benefits are available and they should be granted to student-
athletes. The tenets of “amateurism” and the “student-athlete” are already 
fragile,187 and as dollar amounts rise, the NCAA’s efforts to shield athletes 
                                                                                                                          
182 See Branch, supra note 1 (setting the national average at about $2 million per coach). 
183 See id. (discussing the hiring of Monte Kiffin at the University of Tennessee). 
184 See, e.g., Joan T.A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Workers’ Compensation Systems: Is 
Federal Reform the Answer?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1083 (“[W]orkers’ compensation has 
moved away from its original goals of uniformity, efficiency, predictability, and fairness to a current 
state of disarray amidst inconsistent state case law and federal regulation.”). 
185 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(k) (West 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-1 (2015); see also 
Whitmore, supra note 70, at 782–83 (showing that state legislatures are just as split on the issue as 
courts have been). 
186 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 396.591 (2015); see also Whitmore, supra note 70, at 783 (explaining 
Nevada’s provision, titled “System to Provide Separate Program of Medical Coverage for Members of 
Athletic Teams of the University of Nevada System”). The statute Whitmore discusses used to have 
mandatory language for providing coverage, which has since been amended to state that schools “may” 
provide coverage. 
187 See, Branch, supra note 1 (“[T]he real scandal . . . [is] that two of the noble principles on 
which the NCAA justifies its existence—‘amateurism’ and the ‘student-athlete’—are cynical hoaxes, 
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from compensation become weaker. The workers’ compensation system is 
not perfect, but it is modest. It allows for some security that student-
athletes are more than deserving of in a cartel-like system in which former 
president of the NCAA, Walter Byers, argues “[t]he college player cannot 
sell his own feet (the coach does that) nor can he sell his own name (the 
college will do that).”188 College athletics has become a massive industry 
that has caused the very architects of the system to turn on it as far too 
exploitative. Byers, the very creator of the word “student-athlete,”189 is 
now disgusted with the organization, arguing that “[t]his is the plantation 
mentality resurrected and blessed by today’s campus executives.”190 While 
providing workers’ compensation benefits is not a full fix to the issues that 
commercialization of college athletics and the “student-athlete” have 
raised, it is a safe place to start. 
 
                                                                                                                          
legalistic confections propagated by the universities so they can exploit the skills and fame of young 
athletes.”). 
188 Id.  
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
